Stock Market Reaction to the Global Financial Crisis: testing for the Lehman Brothers' Event by Becchetti, Leonardo & Ciciretti, Rocco
 
Stock Market Reaction to the Global Financial Crisis: 








1) Department of Economics, University of Roma Tor Vergata 
Rome, Italy 
 
2) SEFeMEQ Department, University of Roma Tor Vergata and 






SIRP WP 11-03 
 
Sustainable Investment and Corporate Governance Working Papers, 





      
 
Stock Market Reaction to the Global Financial Crisis: 








1) University of Roma Tor Vergata, Department of Economics, Via Columbia 2, 00133 Roma - 
Italia e-mail: becchetti@economia.uniroma2.it 
 
2) Corresponding author. SEFeMEQ Department, University of Roma Tor Vergata and 
EPRU, School of Management-University of Leicester.  
Corresponding address: Via Columbia 2, 00133 Roma - Italia.  







We analyse with an event study approach the stock market reaction to Lehman Brothers' ling 
for chapter 11. Our inquiry on abnormal returns of about 2,700 stocks around the event date 
documents that RiskMetrics-KLD corporate governance and product quality indexes capture 
factors a ecting investors' reaction to the shock. We also nd that investors rationally attribute 
more value to the information on each rating domain than to affiliation/non-affiliation to the 
FTSE KLD 400 Social Index. Investors seem to discover, after the event, that KLD ratings 
provide original information which is not captured by traditional nancial rating indicators. 
 
Keywords: Global Financial Crisis, Event Study, Corporate Governance, Product Quality, 
Ratings. 
JEL codes: G14, G24, G01. 
 
*) Earlier version of this paper were circulated under the title "Stock Market Reaction to the Global 
Financial Crisis: the Role of Corporate Governance and Product Quality Ratings in the Lehman 
Brothers' Event". The authors thank Annalisa Fabretti, Meryem Fethi, Iftekhar Hasan, Stefano Herzel, 
Lars Hassel, Mohamed Shaban, Marco Nicolosi, Clas Wihlborg, and all participants to the 2010 
MISTRA Workshop on Sustainable Investiment-Roma, 23rd AFBC-Sydney, 2011 XII Workshop on 
Quantitative Finance-Padova, 2011 ICEEE-Pisa, 2010 Seminar cycle at University of Leicester School 
of Management-EPRU, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute-ICFR, University of Perugia-DEFS for useful 
comments and discussions. The research was developed within the SIRP initiative on Sustainable 
Investment (www:sirp:se). The MISTRA grant is gratefully acknowledged. We also thank LUISS 
University for data support on news event. The usual disclaimer applies. Stock Market Reaction to the Global Financial
Crisis: testing for the Lehman Brothers' Event
Abstract
We analyse with an event study approach the stock market reaction to Lehman Broth-
ers' ling for chapter 11. Our inquiry on abnormal returns of about 2,700 stocks around
the event date documents that RiskMetrics-KLD corporate governance and product
quality indexes capture factors aecting investors' reaction to the shock. We also nd
that investors rationally attribute more value to the information on each rating do-
main than to aiation/non-aliation to the FTSE KLD 400 Social Index. Investors
seem to discover, after the event, that KLD ratings provide original information which
is not captured by traditional nancial rating indicators.
Keywords: Global Financial Crisis, Event Study, Corporate Governance, Product
Quality, Ratings.
Jel Numbers: G14, G24, G01.1. Introduction
\The market's focus will now shift from estimates of write-downs,
capital needs and merger and acquisition scenarios,
to concerns about counterparty exposures and default risks"
Research note, Panmure Gordon & Co analyst Sandy Chen (15 September 2008).
The global nancial crisis of 2008-2009 was one of the most dramatic and
path-breaking events in nancial history. Since the crisis is still very close in
time, the vast amount of analyses and reections in the press are not paral-
leled for the moment by a similar number of rigorous theoretical and empirical
analyses.
Our paper aims to ll this gap by evaluating with an event study the stock
market's reaction to one of the most important episodes in the crisis: the an-
nouncement on 15 September 2008 by Lehman Brothers that it would le for
chapter 11.
More specically, we are interested in verifying how stock markets reacted to
this specic event. Since Lehman received negative net rating scores for corpo-
rate governance and product quality from social rating agencies, we investigate
whether abnormal returns of other companies were aected by social ratings
in these two domains at the event date. In this respect, another specic line
of inquiry is whether social ratings mattered only when indirectly signaled by
aliation to a CSR index or whether investors were able to react to such infor-
mation also for non CSR index aliated rms. In other words, we are interested
in verifying whether investors were able to exploit the superior informational
content of analytic net scores on the specic CSR domains contained in the
RiskMetrics database or in other similar information sets.1;2
Our measure of social rating consists in one of the best-known benchmarks
of social responsibility: the selection criteria used for the FTSE KLD 400 Social
Index compiled by RiskMetrics-KLD.3
Being part of the index is undoubtedly a signal of CSR quality. However,
since the index has a xed number of constituents, exits may only be determined
by a CSR downgrading or a lack of representativeness due to a sharp fall in the
stock market value (lack of social and nancial representation according to the
standard RiskMetrics-KLD denition). As a consequence, it is not uncommon
to nd many stocks of high CSR quality on the waiting list.
For this reason we are interested in evaluating whether investors rationally
react, beyond index aliation, to the impact of the specic RiskMetrics-KLD
1As well known, the literature denes as signals those information sets which can be manip-
ulated by the agents to which they are attributed. In this sense CSR ratings are a particular
type of signal since their characteristics depend on both the action of the rated company and
the evaluation of such action by a third party (the rating agency).
2RiskMetrics Group acquired in 2009 the Kinder, Lydenberg, and Domini Research & Ana-
lytics, Inc. (hereby RiskMetrics-KLD). Kinder, Lydenberg, and Domini Research & Analytics,
Inc. was an investment research rm providing management tools to professionals integrating
environmental, social and governance factors (ESG) into their investment decisions.
3For further details see Appendix A.
2scores in each of the seven CSR domains. As we will document later, our main
results outline a \ight to CSR quality" eect where the rating weaknesses of
Lehman Brothers (corporate governance and product quality) are the most im-
portant factors aecting abnormal returns on other stocks at the event date. We
argue that the 15th September shock led investors to a dierent interpretation
of these signals in regard to their eects on the market value of the stock.
The paper focuses on three main strands of literature. First, it contributes
to studies on the relationship between corporate governance quality and equity
prices. In their inuential paper, Gompers et al. (2003) <29> investigate the
long run eects of the Corporate Governance Quality (CGQ) index on stock re-
turns and balance sheet indicators in the 1990s.4 The authors observe that their
analysis cannot completely solve the problem of endogeneity by disentangling
direct and reverse causality eects and controlling for correlation of dependent
and independent variables with a third omitted driver. This is especially the
case of some of the balance sheet indicators considered by Gompers et al. (2003)
<29>, which may exhibit persistence under the form of positive autocorrelation
across time. Our event study looks at the problem from a dierent angle and
on a dierent historical moment, thereby enriching knowledge in this specic
eld. Even though our study observes a phenomenon and the reaction to it in a
much more limited time span, it identies a temporal and logical sequence from
the event (announcement of the Lehman Brothers' bankruptcy) to its eect
(ex post abnormal returns of observed securities which cannot be considered as
causes of the exogenous shock generated by the announcement thereby ruling
out the possibility of reverse causation). It is likewise dicult to assume that
a third omitted variable (unrelated to factors captured by our indicators such
as transparency, accountability and product quality) caused both the event and
the prompt reaction to it by the stock prices under analysis. Furthermore, if
analysis of long run stock returns is the right choice when trying to evaluate
whether a given factor aects corporate nancial performance over a long period
of time, the long run consequences of the present global nancial crisis cannot
yet be investigated, while event studies are well suited to analyzing the short
term nancial market reaction to one of its crucial events. 5
A second strand of the literature to which our paper intends to contribute
concerns the relationship between product quality and stock market perfor-
4The authors build an index based on 24 attributes and evaluate on a sample of around
1;500 stocks the impact of the latter on several balance sheet indicators and alphas of port-
folios of stocks aggregated on ascending/descending values of that index. One of their main
ndings is that an investment strategy which buys shares in the portfolio of stocks with high-
est shareholder rights, and sells those in the portfolio of stocks with lowest shareholder rights
would earn around 8:5 % per year in terms of abnormal returns in the 1990s.
5Another important dierence when comparing our approach to Gompers et al. (2003)
<29> is that (as shown in Appendix A) the RiskMetrics-KLD concept of corporate governance
quality is somewhat dierent from that of the CGQ index. Although far from complete, it is
interesting for its stronger emphasis on the issue of manager compensation policies, a question
on which public opinion became much more sensitive after the crisis.
3mance. The empirical literature in this eld has mainly focused on the eects
of product recalls (understood as negative signals of product quality) on stock
market performance and, more specically, on drug and automobile recalls, nd-
ing most of the time negative abnormal returns around the event date <42>.
In general, in these papers the stock market reaction has been shown to ex-
ceed the actual ex post costs due to recalls and the excess loss is interpreted
by the authors as a loss of \goodwill" (reputation).6 Our contribution to this
research eld is in looking at the eect of product quality on stock performance
based on events occurred to a stock (dierent from those we observe) which
may have generated negative externalities on rms with similar product quality
KLD performance.
Finally, we contribute to the literature on corporate social responsibility
and stock performance. Corporate social responsibility may be viewed as an en-
hanced concern in corporate strategies for the environment and for stakeholders
other then shareholders (mainly consumers, workers, suppliers and local commu-
nities).7;8 As can be clearly observed in the Riskmetrics-KLD criteria which will
be used in our empirical analysis, enhanced stakeholders' satisfaction implies in
most cases higher costs for rms which decide to pursue CSR oriented policies
(i.e., on waste management and polluting emissions, on workers' satisfaction,
and on philanthropic activities in favor of local or more distant communities).9
These extra costs can be o-set by ve potential benets. First, CSR may be
seen as an optimal strategy to minimize transaction costs with stakeholders
(Freeman, 1984 <24>). In a country like the US, where class actions facilitate
legal action against corporations, this is an important issue. Second, it may
gain the favor of \concerned" consumers who are willing to pay for the CSR
intangible values (i.e. environmental friendliness) incorporated in the products
and services sold by the rm.10 Third, workers' productivity may be higher
for at least two reasons: i) the eect of enhanced wage and non wage benets
according to the traditional eciency wage theories and ii) the enhanced stimu-
lus of intrinsic motivations due to the reduced gap between workers' ideals and
6Another type of event which has widely been analysed and interpreted as a signal of
product quality consists in airline crashes (see, among others, Chalk, 1987 <15>; Borenstein
and Zimmerman, 1988 <9> and Bosch, Eckard and Singal, 1988 <10>).
7Concern for the environment may be also seen as concern for the consequences of its
degradation on local communities and future generations.
8Among seminal contributions in the debate on pros and cons of the CSR approach see
Friedman (1962) <26> and Freeman (1984) <24>. The discussion on the methodological
problems which may arise when pursuing the goal of maximizing multiple stakeholders inter-
ests can be found in Jensen (1986) <31> and Tirole (2001) <45>.
9The only straightforward cost decreasing element in RiskMetrics-KLD criteria is probably
the limit on managerial compensations.
10For empirical tests on the willingness to pay for intangible social and environmental val-
ues of products revealed in consumer purchases see Becchetti and Rosati (2007) <8>. An
interesting theorization of this phenomenon in oligopolies in which some companies \retail
public goods" is in Ghatak and Besley (2007) <28>.
4corporate goals.11;12 A recent empirical test on this third potential benet of
CSR policies has been performed by Edmans (2009) <19>, who nds that those
who are regarded as top US companies in terms of workers' satisfaction earned
an annual four-factors alpha of 4% from 1984-2005.
Fourth, CSR may foster innovation (i.e. in developing more ecient energy
saving processes), thereby creating a technological leadership and a competitive
advantage. Last but not least, it may be a signal of product quality in a frame-
work of asymmetric information, given that one of the main stakeholder groups
to which CSR refers is that of consumers (product quality is indeed one of the
eight RiskMetrics-KLD domains). In this respect, it may act as a reputation in-
surance mechanism by which consumers are less inclined to blame the company
in the presence of adverse product quality shocks. Minor (2009) <37> tests his
proposition by looking at the eect of product recalls on abnormal returns and
considering 184 events. He nds that rms with better RiskMetrics-KLD rat-
ings earn a 3 percent abnormal return with respect to other rms in the sample.
This gain amounts to 600 million for the sample median (market) value of 23
billion.
Given this uncertain balance between costs and benets it is no wonder that
the empirical evidence on the relationship between CSR and (non nancial)
corporate performance is mixed.13 The same occurs if we specically focus
on stock market performance measuring the consequences of CSR choices on
shareholders' wealth. The interest for empirical research in this area is growing
because almost 1 out of 9 dollars invested in total assets under management in
the US are subject to a CSR screening.14 Among recent contributions Barnea
and Rubin (2010) <5> document that CSR investment is negatively related
to insider ownership. The authors formulate an overinvestment hypothesis to
interpret their ndings: CSR positively aects shareholder value up to a given
level. However, insiders invest in it for reputation purposes, and in particular
when their ownership share is low. Fisman, Heal, and Nair (2006) <22> nd in
general a negative relation between CSR and rm value with KLD data. They
however document that factors such as the presence of outside blockholders with
board representation and competition on the product markets both determine
11See, among others, Yellen (1984) <46>, Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) <43> and Akerlof
(1982) <1> for shirking, turnover and gift exchange models.
12On the relationship between workers' intrinsic motivation and productivity see Ryan et
al. (1991), Frey and Oberholzer-Gee (1997) <25> and Kreps (1997) <35>.
13As is obvious, results in this eld crucially depend on methodologies, time periods, selected
sample and performance variables. For evidence of a positive link see, among others, Ruf et
al. (2001) <40>. Inconclusive ndings are in McWilliams and Siegel (2001) <36> Aupperle,
Caroll and Hateld (1985) <3>. Negative links are found among others by Preston and
O'Bannon (1997) <38> and Freedman and Jaggi (1986) <23>.
14The Report on Social Investing Trends (last available 2007) calculates that there were
2:71 trillion in the same year (increasing from 2:29 trillion dollars in 2005) invested in
total assets under management which use one or more of the three core socially re-
sponsible investing strategies (screening, shareholder advocacy, and community investing).
http://www.socialinvest.org/pdf/SRI Trends ExecSummary 2007.pdf .
5a more positive relationship between CSR and protability. Harjoto and Jo
(2009) nd that CSR is positively related to corporate governance by using
corporate governance data from IRRC/RiskMetrics and CSR data from the
KLD Socrates database on a panel dataset from 1993 to 2004 and attribute their
results to the capacity of CSR of reducing conicts between shareholders and non
investing stakeholders. A similar result between CSR and corporate governance
is obtained by Ammann, Oesch, and Schmid (2010) <2> while Kempf and
Ostho (2007) <33> nd that buying stocks of companies with good social
behavior and selling stocks of social underperformers generates an abnormal
yearly return of up to 8.7
The relative performance of CSR and non-CSR stocks has also been analyzed
by looking at ethically managed and non-ethically managed investment funds.
Bauer, Koedijk and Otten (2002) <6> obtain mixed ndings when comparing
active strategies of the two types of funds, even though they document a learning
process which gradually improves the performance of ethical investment fund
managers. Geczy, Stambaugh and Levin (2005) <27> evaluate the specic cost
of ethical fund management (that is, the restriction of the universe of investable
stocks to those which meet socially responsible investment constraints) in terms
of risk adjusted returns. This cost is shown to depend on the share of SR
investment, views about asset pricing models (SR funds are less able to oer
exposure to size and value factors than to the standard one CAPM factor), and
the ability of stock managers.15
Back to the theoretical rationales advanced to interpret the relative per-
formance of CSR stocks, the specicity of the Lehman event (and the nexus
between its failure and ex ante CSR corporate governance and product quality
ratings) is that it may have revealed to market investors the importance of the
rst (minimization of transaction costs with stakeholders) and fth (CSR as a
signal of product quality) potential benecial eects of CSR on corporate per-
formance, thereby giving rise to an upward (downward) correction of the value
of stocks with good (bad) CSR scores.
Our paper deals with this issues and is divided into ve sections (including
introduction and conclusions). The second section describes the event under
inquiry in more detail. Section 3 briey presents our methodological approach.
Section 4 illustrates the econometric ndings, while some interpretations of them
are provided in section 5. The sixth section concludes.
2. The Lehman event
Extremely high leverage, liquidity risk and overexposure in mortgage securi-
tisation were the three main factors responsible for Lehman Brothers' risky po-
sition before the crisis. The 31 : 1 leverage ratio implied that a 3 4% reduction
15Other papers nding non signicant dierences in performance are those by Schroder
(2007) <41>, and Statman and Glushkov (2007) <44>. However a negative eect of envi-
ronmental and community screens is found by Brammer, Brooks and Pavelin (2006) <11>,
while a negative eect for social screen by Renneboog, Horst and Zhang (2008) <39>.
6in the value of its assets would eliminate its equity or book value.16 Liquidity
risk was implied by its asset liability mismatch. The SFAS 157 accounting rule
on Fair Value classies assets and liabilities in three levels in ascending order of
liquidity (from Level I very liquid and easy to value to Level III illiquid and hard
to value). Before the crisis Lehman had a dominant share of illiquid assets (218
out of 291 billion dollars) against mainly liquid liabilities (109 out of 149 billion
were Level I). Third, as well known, Lehman was overexposed in securitizing
residential mortgages (246 billions between 2006 and 2007). In this respect, as
also well known, the move from the \originate to hold" to the \originate to dis-
tribute" model implied by the securitisation approach eliminated the standard
arm-length relationship between lenders and borrowers with the perverse eect
of not weakening the incentive to lend to mortgage holders with unsustainable
debt service (interest payment to income) ratios. Even though worries about
the company led to a sharp drop of its stock price even before Chapter 11, there
were hopes for a dierent solution (i.e., a sale to Bank of America and Barclays)
until the event date. Above all, no previous failures of the largest nancial in-
termediaries had challenged the \too big to fail" assumption according to which
large nancial intermediaries should not be left go bankrupt due to the systemic
consequences of their failure.
Advance notice that Lehman Brothers was ling for Chapter 11 arrived at
7 am of the 15 September 2008. The ocial news release came at 11 : 43.
It is well known that the Lehman Brothers' default severely increased coun-
terparty risk because the failed company had $729 billion of notional derivative
contracts, amounting to an estimated fair value of around $16:6 billion at the
event date. The same company disclosed that it had $25:6 billion of over-the-
counter currency, interest rate and credit default swaps.
An even bigger problem was that the credit default swaps written on Lehman
debt amounted to around $350 billion. The settlement of these contracts would
have probably triggered the default of the insuring party.
The above-described linkages between Lehman Brothers and many other
actors in nancial markets and the risk of additional defaults, coupled with un-
certainty about the rescue plans of governments and central banks to prevent
a collapse of the payment system, generated a  4:7% loss of the S&P500 Com-
posite Index (S&P500) index at the event date. As shown in Figure 1 the event
marked the beginning of a dramatic plunge in the Index during the following
month.
What should be born in mind that the RiskMetrics-KLD social rating used
in our analysis registered, before the crisis, concerns about Lehman Brothers.
In fact RiskMetrics-KLD assigned to Lehman negative net scores in the two
domains of corporate governance and product quality concerns (see section 3).
Our purpose in what follows is therefore to test whether investors reacted with
16http://www.secinfo.com/d11MXs.t5Bb.htm#1stPage, Lehman 2007 Annual Report. See
Item 6 on Page 29 for ratios.
7Figure 1: S&P500 Composite Index
The gure shows S&P500 Composite Index level from six months (estimation window) before
the event day to one month after.
Source: Elaboration on daily Thomson Reuters Datastream data.
a \ight to CSR quality" by punishing companies with weaknesses in the same
two domains or, more generally, in all RiskMetrics-KLD domains.
3. Our theoretical hypotheses
Given the characteristics of the above-mentioned event, our assumption is
that the Lehman episode induced investors to reassess (and increase) the weight
of the impact that CSR quality signals on the fundamental value of stocks.
Let us assume that investors evaluate stocks according to a standard dis-






where D0 is the current dividend and E[gt] is the yearly expected rate of
growth of dividends. As well known, this standard approach becomes much
8more complex if life of the rm is decomposed into a high growth period which
is limited in time and followed by a \normal" one where the stock behaves as a
terminal bond and grows forever at the rate of growth of the economy (Claus
and Thomas, 2001 <16>). What practitioners use to calculate the denominator
is generally a proxy of a risk-free rate plus an estimate of the risk premium mul-
tiplied by exposure to systematic non-diversiable risk of the industry stocks.
Investors are imperfectly informed and can use as the nominator the ex-
pected growth rate of earnings derived from consensus forecasts by I/B/E/S
analysts on-one and two-periods-ahead earnings per share - that can be con-
sidered the observed variable which is more akin to the rational expectations
concept (Keane and Runkle, 1998 <32>) - as proxies for the expected rate of
growth of dividends.
It is likely that the reliability of such forecasts (and investors' condence in
them) depends on the investors' perception of corporate trustworthiness. We ac-
cordingly expected that, within RiskMetrics-KLD domains, scores for corporate
governance and product quality became signals of corporate trustworthiness in-
creasingly taken into account by investors after the Lehman event. Three likely
explanations about the channels through which this may occur may be provided
(Fasan and Mio <21>). First, Lehman Brothers was weak in corporate gov-
ernance and product quality domains in the RiskMetrics-KLD ratings. More
specically, it recorded a zero level of strengths in both Product Quality and
Corporate Governance: it scored  1 and  2 for Product Quality and Corporate
Governance concern respectively, according to the last RiskMetrics-KLD release
before the crisis.17 After the event, therefore, investors may have interpreted
positive net scores in such domains as signals of corporate reputation which
reduce the probability of negative surprises such as those that forced Lehman
Brothers to default (see the introductory caption of section 1).
Second, the Lehman shock increased demand for transparency (Cornell and
Shapiro, 1987 <17>) from non-investor stakeholders. In this perspective in-
vestors interpreted higher CSR scores as signals of greater corporate capacity
to deal with such claims.
Third, (as a sort of second order eect) after the event, nancial analysts
not directly demanding greater transparency may have considered that closer
and more trustworthy relationships with stakeholders (signaled by higher CSR
scores) could reduce the post-crisis costs generated by the collapse of trust which
would negatively aect economic relationships between corporations and some
of their stakeholders (such as clients and suppliers). In this case good CSR
ratings are expected to reduce (or to increase relatively less than in rms with
bad CSR ratings) transaction costs with stakeholders after the event.
For these reasons we formulate the following hypotheses:
H1: CSR net scores (algebraic sum of strengths and weaknesses) positively
aect abnormal returns on observed stocks at the Lehman event date.
17See Tables 1-3 for detailed statistics.
9H2: corporate governance and product quality are two CSR signals aecting
abnormal returns after the Lehman event
H3: nancial analysts eciently exploit CSR information: the signicance
of direct analytic scores on CSR strengths and weaknesses of the RiskMetrics-
KLD database dominates that of aliation to a CSR stock market index.
Note that hypothesis 2 can be generalised in the sense that an event like
the Lehman ling generates a shift of investor focus and concerns over corpo-
rate downside risk, thereby increasing the weight attributed to signals related
to product quality and corporate governance, since these two RiskMetrics-KLD
specic domains are, by denition, those more informative with respect to such
downside risk (and denitely more so than the other 6 CSR domains, i.e. com-
munity, diversity, employee relations, environment, human rights and contro-
versial business industries). The fact that Lehman was weak exactly in the
product quality and corporate governance domains reinforces the hypothesis on
their dominant role in these particular critical scenarios.
4. Empirical Analysis and Results
A rst important methodological step in an event study is the denition
of the event window, that is, the period of interest over which the impact of
an event is measured. The more days are included in the event window, the
lower becomes the power of the methodology (Brown and Warner, 1980) <12>.
In our case we select a ve-day event window. Considering the nature of this
unexpected event, abnormal returns are calculated starting from the day prior
to the event (in order to take account of possible anticipation of the news), so
that the event window is (-1;+3) with 0 as event day (see table 1 for descriptive
statistics on AR 1 to AR+3).
In order to compute normal returns of the stock we use the standard market
model:
Ri = i + iRm + i (1)
where  is the estimation window interval, Ri and Rm are the compounded
continuous returns in  of the security i in market m, respectively, and i is the
zero mean disturbance term. In the literature the simple market model generally
provides results which are robust to estimation of \normal returns" with its most
common alternatives (Fama-French three factor models<20>, other multifactor
models, ARCH/GARCH models).18 This is because such alternatives have much
higher probability of statistically insignicant parameters and therefore much
higher noise on the normal return which is automatically transferred in the
18See among others Becchetti, Ciciretti and Hasan (2007) <7>.
10measure of the abnormal return (Brown-Warner, 1985 <13>; Campbell et al.,
1997 <14>).
The estimation window length is another key decision to take in event stud-
ies. If the normal market return model structure is expected to vary frequently
across time (i.e. due time varying betas), a too long window may miss that
change, under-representing the more recent normal market return structure.
On the other hand, a too short estimation window may not have enough de-
grees of freedom to properly capture the model structure. Being aware of this,
our rst choice is a six months window, followed by a robustness check to control
whether our results are conrmed with a shorter (2 months) window.19 Using
the market model as the normal performance return model, abnormal return
is dened as the residual between the observed and the predicted return, as
follows:
d ARit = "
it = Rit   ^ i   ^ iR
m (2)
where AR is calculated in the event window, while ^ i and ^ i are coecients
estimated in (1).
A subsequent step is to regress the dened abnormal returns on their poten-
tial determinants which include CSR ratings (see section 4.3). The specications
are estimated with OLS with White heteroskedasticity robust standard errors.
The latter allow account to be taken of the problem of spatial heteroskedasticity,
which is typical in short run propagation mechanisms around a crisis event.
4.1. Data Denition
Our sample consists of 2;603 US listed stock companies is we consider the
6-month estimation period.20 Daily prices, trading volumes, industry sectors
(according to the Industry Classication Benchmark (ICB)) and number of em-
ployees (as a proxy for rm size) were collected using Thomson Reuters Datas-
tream.21 Daily returns are calculated as continuously compounded returns, that
is, as the natural log of the ratio between Pt and Pt 1.
Aliation to FTSE KLD 400 Social Index was taken from RiskMetrics his-
torical spreadsheets (last 2007 release before Lehman event) as well as social
rating. The FTSE KLD 400 Social Index is a market-capitalization-weighted
stock index whose constituents are 400 publicly traded US companies that have
met high standards of social and environmental excellence. RiskMetrics pro-
vides scores on strengths and weaknesses for sample stocks on seven specic
19All results in the rest of the paper are robust to the use of the 8-months, 4-months, 2-
months estimation window as well as to that of truncated (and cut-o) distributions of AR(0)
(1st and 99th centile) for all estimation windows.
20We start from 3,285 companies in RiskMetrics dataset which become 2,677 after cleaning
for: data not available (for industry), database error (i.e. prices equal to zero or constant
prices over time). Finally, using Brown and Warner (1985) <13> hypothesis, we end up with
2603 companies.
21According to ICB, industry sectors are (companies in our dataset): Basic Materials (101);
Consumer Goods (228); Consumer Services (371); Financials (561); Healthcare (291); Indus-
trials (448); Oil & Gas (154); Technology (332); Telecommunications (37); Utilities (80).
11domains i) community; ii) corporate governance; iii) diversity; iv) employee re-
lations; v) environment; vi) human rights; and vii) product quality; 22 We dene
the variable netstrength as the sum of strengths minus the sum of concerns for
all possible CSR domains according to RiskMetrics social rating. Furthermore
we create net indicators (netstrengthsi, where i stands for community, corpo-
rate governance, diversity, employee, environment, human rights and product)
for each of the above domains i) to viii) as the algebraic sum between each
domain strength and each domain concern (see Table 2 for details). Finally,
news concerning Lehman Brothers, its timing and previous information about
the company were collected using Dow Jones Factiva.
4.2. Descriptive Findings
In Tables 1   3 we present descriptive statistics for the variables used in
our empirical analysis. Table 1 documents that the average abnormal return
across sample stocks is much higher at the event day (0:7%) than the day be-
fore (0:03%) and the day after (0:1%). Median abnormal returns express an
even stronger dierence among the same three days ( 0:1%, 0:2% and 1:2% re-
spectively). Descriptive statistics suggest that there is something not included
in the \normal return" model at the event date. The econometric ndings in
the following section will provide evidence consistent with these rst descriptive
indications, showing that the impact of the event was not anticipated while, in
some cases, it persisted after the event date. If we consider net RiskMetrics-
KLD strengths reported in Table 2 (sum of strengths minus sum of weaknesses,
dened as netstrengthsi) we nd that the range shrinks from  11 to 15, whereas
we see that, when aggregating RiskMetrics-KLD scores on the 8 CSR domains
(the variable totstr is the sum of strengths in the 8 domains, whereas totcon is
the sum of concerns), the maximum is 17 for weaknesses and 22 for strengths.
Looking at specic domains we nd that both corporate governance and product
quality range from -4 to +2. More in general, Tables 2 and 3 provide extreme
values for strengths and concerns for each individual CSR domain. Minima and
maxima reported in these tables are used to calculate the maximum magnitude
of the impact of a given CRS domain in our econometric ndings. We dene
such maximum magnitude as the dierence in abnormal returns between two
stocks located at the two extremes of the value range. Finally, descriptive statis-
tics of the natural log of employee variable (logemployee) which is used in the
econometric analysis as a proxy for industry size, are also provided in Table 3.
4.3. Hypothesis testing
To test our hypotheses we ran parametric (t-test, J1 and J2) and non-
parametric [sign (J3), Corrado rank (J4), and G-rank-t] tests for the entire
22Additional scores are provided for involvement in controversial business issues (alcohol,
rearms, gambling, military, nuclear power, tobacco). Details on RiskMetrics-KLD criteria
are provided in Appendix A.
12sample (Table 4).23 Table 4 (column 3) conrms that the event was not an-
ticipated by the market. The result is also supported by the G-rank-t for the
variable AR(0) AR( 1) in column (8) which documents as well a slow market
reaction.
A Monte Carlo simulation was ran to evaluate the power of non-parametric
tests. In particular we check if the frequency rate of rejection of H0, when false
(1-), of G-Rank-t is bigger than frequency rate of Corrado rank test due to
the power of the correction factor. Simulated panel with 2,603 securities and
the stock market series (10,000 draws for each estimation window), each time
series is modeled as a geometric Brownian motion (that t better with respect
to stock price movements):
dS = St + Sdz; (3)
where  and s are, respectively, drift (the expected investor rate of return)
and standard deviation. We perform the simulation with dierent  and s
starting from the (historical) values calculated on a sample period including
estimation plus event window and following with  and s of the estimation win-
dow, the event window,the event date, and nally the exponential  and s The
simulation is repeated with 1,000 draws. Average values of the G-Rank-t test
for the 10,000 draws with the historical  and s are reported in Table 5. Looking
at the entire values of the G-Rank-t test coming from the Monte Carlo simula-
tion, we observe that the test accepts with higher frequency the null hypothesis
with respect to the Corrado rank test. This nding conrms the idea that the
G-rank-t test is more reliable for this kind of macro events [see table 4 column
(7) and (8)].
We also perform a random event date selection in order to check the (C)AR
in a normal trading day. Three days are randomly selected with replacement
from a population of 250 trading-days in 2008. Selection is made from a discrete
uniform distribution. Abnormal returns in the randomly selected event days are
23J1 and J2 parametric tests verify the signicance of our CARs. Under suspicion of a CAR
variance bias due to AR aggregation the use of J2 is more appropriate since the J2 correction
factor gives high weight to the observation with low variance. We reject the null hypothesis of
J1 and J2 of absence of abnormal performance when jJ1j,jJ2j>1:64. Since abnormal returns are
generally not normally distributed we also look at non-parametric tests. The null hypothesis
of sign test is the equidistribution of C(AR)s signs around the median. Since the Lehman
event has a negative impact on the market, the alternative hypothesis is in our case that the
number of minus signs is larger than that of plus signs. We reject the null hypothesis when:
Sign-Test< 1:64. The Corrado rank test assumes, under the null hypothesis that there is
equidistribution in the distance of ranked C(AR)s from median rank. We reject the null
hypothesis when jCorrado-Testj>1:64. The power of the Corrado test drops o rapidly as the
number of the days in the CAR length increase (II type error-). The G-rank-t (Kolari and
Pynonnen, 2010 <34>) has the same null hypothesis of the Corrado test but is especially
devised for macro events since return cross-correlation goes to zero by the properties of the
G-Rank-t asymptotic distribution.
13not signicant (see Table 6).
Our ndings are also substantially unaltered for 8-month, 6-month, 4-month
and 2-month estimation windows: for instance, both net corporate governance
(netcgov) and net product (netpro) remain signicant at 5% for CAR(0;+2) (net
corporate governance slightly decreases from 1:09% to 0:62% while net product
quality goes from 1:42% to 1:41%).
Finally, we perform all the previous steps with cut-o and truncated distri-
bution of abnormal returns at 1st and 99th centile for all estimation windows in
order to eliminate potential outliers from our estimate.
4.4. Econometric Findings
Parametric and non parametric hypothesis testing and the robustness checks
presented above documented the signicance of abnormal returns in the selected
event window. With our econometric analysis we may however test more prop-
erly the three hypotheses formulated in Section 3 by evaluating the magnitude
of estimated (C)ARs net of the impact of standard controls. In order to test
the rst hypothesis we regress abnormal returns calculated at dierent inter-
vals around the event date - AR(-1), AR(0), AR(+1), AR(+2), AR(+3) and
CAR(0;+1) and CAR(0;+2) - on our netstrength variable, that is, the sum of
strengths minus the sum of concerns from all possible CSR domains.
We estimate the eect of the aggregate netstrength variable on abnormal
returns from the observed stocks under two dierent specications which include
among controls: i) logemployees as a proxy for rm size; ii) industry dummies.
Without industry dummies (rst specication) we have signicant abnormal
returns from the day before the event to the day +2, with positive and signicant
cumulative abnormal returns for CAR(0;+2) and CAR (0;+1) (Table 4, columns
1-7). The anomaly of the negative abnormal return the day before the event
disappears when we include industry dummies (second specication). In the
augmented specication the eect is now positive and signicant in the event
date and the day after, even though smaller in magnitude (Table 4, columns
8-14). The hypothesis of a signicant impact of the CSR scores on abnormal
returns at the event date is therefore not rejected by our data.
Among other regressors the size variable (logemployee) is negative and sig-
nicant in days +1, +2 and +3 after controlling for industry dummies.24
Moving from statistical to economic signicance, we focus on the event day
eect in specication ii), nding that the maximum dierence in magnitude of
abnormal returns for two rms set at the two extremes of the total strength=
weaknesses distribution - two rms with the worst and the best possible CSR
rating - is 5:07% (3:38% if we consider the distribution represented by the ob-
served extremes of the net strength variable). The same two numbers for the
24If we adopt the Hong and Stein (1999) <30> framework of heterogeneity of investors with
fundamentalist and less informed traders who just look at prices we could interpret this as a
delayed eect caused by sales of uninformed traders under the assumption that their share is
higher in large stocks.
14CAR (0;+2) are respectively 11:39% and 7:54%. If we look at economic signif-
icance by considering the impact of a one standard deviation change we nd
that the net strength eects are :28%, :20%, and :64% respectively for AR(0),
AR(0), and CAR(0;+2).
In order to test hypothesis two (H2) we replace in Table 5 the aggregate
netstrength indicator with net scores (netstrengthsi), namely strengths minus
concerns recorded on each of the seven elds of CSR (community, corporate
governance, diversity, employee relations, environment, human rights, product
quality).
Results from estimates of the new specication clearly show that the two
strongest and more persistent eects are those from corporate governance and
product quality indicators (netcgov and netpro, the two CSR features on which
Lehman had net negative scores). The corporate governance eect lasts three
days (from the day before to the day after) and is positive and signicant. The
product quality eect materializes from day 0 to day 2. All other CSR domains
(with the exception of environment the day before the event) are not signicant if
we look at the specication which includes industry dummies (Table 10, columns
1   7). Cumulative abnormal returns are positive and strongly signicant only
for the corporate governance and product quality variables. Results from Table 5
support hypothesis two (H2) that the eect is concentrated on the CSR domains
in which Lehman was weaker.
The magnitude of the eect of the signicant net scores over specic CSR
domains is again not negligible (the estimates in Table 10 correcting for indus-
try dummies imply that a unit change in the corporate governance (product
quality) net score generates a 1% (1:4%) CAR(0;+2)). This implies a dierence
in abnormal returns of 3:59% for the AR(0) and 7:02% for the CAR(0;+2) for
two stocks located respectively at the left to the right extreme of the net cor-
porate governance indicator. For the product quality indicator the same two
numbers are 3:19% and 10:15%. If we look at the impact of one standard devi-
ation change of the same two net scores we have 1:17%(:98%), :74%(:95%), and
2:36%(3:19%) respectively for AR(0), AR(1), and CAR(0;+2).
In order to test hypothesis three (H3) we add a dummy for stocks included
in the FTSE KLD 400 Social Index (reported as FTSE KLD 400 in Tables
9, and 10) to evaluate the relative weight given by investors to information
from analytic CSR scores vis  a vis information from CSR index aliation. The
hypothesis on the signicance of this variable may be seen as a test on the
importance of passive investors' buy and hold strategies on the FTSE KLD 400
Social Index. The domini dummy is neither signicant in the specication with
the aggregate net strength indicator (Table 6), nor in that with net strengths
for individual CSR domains (Table 7). These ndings conrm that investors
have access to analytic CSR scores and exploit their higher informative content.
What we have assumed so far by creating a unique net strength index is that
the stock market reaction to strengths and weaknesses is symmetric. In Table
8 we disaggregate strengths and concerns of dierent CSR domains and nd
15that reaction to concerns lasts longer than that to strengths. More specically,
corporate governance concerns (cgovcon) have a three day eect (from the day
before to two days after the event date), while corporate governance strengths
(cgovstr) are signicant only at the event day. Cumulative average abnormal re-
turns are however not so dissimilar. The dierence between the strength and the
concern indicators in the product quality domain is more marked. The impact of
the event on product quality lasts three days when we look at concerns (procon),
while it is not signicant when we consider strengths (prostr). The CAR(0;+2)
attributable to the concern indicator is 1:09%. If we look at the impact of a
one standard deviation change for the corporate governance (product quality)
concern scores we get  1:11%( 1:27%),  :69%( 1:19%), and  2:45%( 3:80%)
respectively for AR(0), AR(1), and CAR(0;+2). We interpret this asymmetry
as due to the fact that concerns impact on downside price risk and probability
of default and therefore aect the reassessment of the stock evaluation after the
Lehman Brothers event more than strengths (see again the introductory caption
in section 1).
5. Further interpretation of our ndings
As in any event study an abnormal return may be determined by the impact
of the event or by a reassessment of the stand alone value of the stock. Our
interpretation of the ndings presented in the previous sections is that CSR
rated quality is a signal of both.
In the former case the event itself creates a more risky nancial market
environment which aects stock evaluation (and risk of default). The market
value revision may be proportional to the rated corporate governance quality,
which is interpreted as a proxy for the counterpart risk run by the rm (i.e.
weight of positions in nancial derivatives).
In the latter case (reassessment of the stand alone value) our result may
be due to the fact that nancial analysts correct their underestimation of the
importance of social responsibility and quality of corporate governance in terms
of signals of reduced default risk in a framework of asymmetric information. The
fact that the CSR factors which are more signicant are corporate governance
and product quality (the only two factors on which Lehman Brothers had net
negative scores) is consistent with this interpretation. More specically, what
we measure is not a general eect of product quality and corporate governance
RiskMetrics-KLD ratings on stock market returns but the reassessment of their
eect on them after the Lehman event, which shifted the focus of investors to
downside risk. This explain the asymmetric eect of ratings (product quality
weaknesses having more impact than strengths in Table 8).
It is not possible to disentangle these two (impact of the event and reassess-
ment of the stand alone value) eects also because they are strictly correlated.
Another relevant nding in our regressions (even though not conrmed in
sign and rank non parametric tests which however do not fully take into account
for AR magnitudes) is the slow market reaction to the event. In the Lehman
story both prior notice and the ocial release occurred on the same trading
16day (15 of September) so that the 16 of September is denitely a post-event
trading day. Nevertheless, we observe in many estimates (see Tables 4 8) that
the reaction continued on this and on the following day with abnormal returns
which were mostly in the same direction as on the event day. The phenomenon
of slow market reaction has been thoroughly investigated in the recent nancial
literature and three main explanations may apply to our case. First, Daniel et al.
1997 <18> point to overcondence and biased self-attribution by assuming that
investors overreact to private and underreact to public information. A second
line of thought (Barberis et al., 1998 <4>) hinges on representative heuristics
and argues that investors overreact to news. A third approach (Hong and Stein,
1999 <30>) assumes the existence of two types of traders. The rst look at news
while the second reacts only to prices. This implies underreaction (only the rst
group reacts to the news) and subsequent overreaction (the second group reacts
to price changes).
6. Conclusions
Corporate governance and product quality are two fundamental factors af-
fecting corporate performance and stock market value. In a framework of asym-
metric information, investors are imperfectly informed about these two factors
and have to formulate their expectations by extracting signals on them. One of
the sources of these signals is CSR rating agencies.
The hypothesis set forth in our paper is that the Lehman Brothers event (the
failure of such an important company which exhibited positive nancial ratings
but negative CSR ratings on corporate governance and product quality) may
have led investors to reassess the value of the stocks by increasing the weight
attributed to specic CSR information or to consider a stronger negative impact
of the event on stocks with similar weaknesses.
Our empirical ndings demonstrate that, by using the same sources which
produced the above mentioned negative ratings on Lehman (the RiskMetrics-
KLD database), net strengths on corporate governance and product quality
generate signicant abnormal returns around the event date on a sample of
around 2;600 stocks listed on the US stock exchange. We also document that
investors do not react to stock inclusion in the FTSE KLD 400 Social Index but
rationally look at the single analytical scores and attribute, among them, more
weight to the two (corporate governance and product quality) in which Lehman
was weaker. This can also be explained by the fact that CSR index aliation is
a weaker signal which contains a lot of noise due to the xed number of index
constituents problem and to the existence of a waiting list of top CSR rms
which are not included in the index.25
Another important element in our regression results is that nancial market
reaction to the shock extends beyond the event date. This is consistent (among
other possible interpretations) with the hypothesis of a heterogeneous market
25See Appendix B for further details.
17microstructure in which more informed traders react rst and a group of follow-
ers, looking only at price signals, react secondly once they have observed the
price dynamics.
A more general result of our paper is that investors seem to discover, after
the event, that CSR ratings perform a crucial role in nancial markets by pro-
viding original information which is not captured by traditional nancial rating
indicators and not already incorporated into prices.
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24Table 4: Parametric (t-test, J1 and J2), and non-parametric (Sing, Corrado rank,
and G-rank-t) robustness test
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES mean Obs t-test J1 J2 Sign Corrado G-Rank-t
test Rank test test
AR(-1) 0.0000 2603 0.04 - - 3.16 2.12** 1.10
AR(0) 0.0055 2603 3.74*** - - -15.03*** 2.18** 1.11
AR(+1) 0.0011 2603 1.18 - - -3.47*** 2.23** 1.11
AR(+2) 0.0029 2603 2.47*** - - -4.61*** 2.27** 1.12
AR(+3) 0.0159 2603 11.34*** - - -6.80*** 2.96*** 1.18
AR(0)-AR(-1) 0.0055 2603 3.32*** 0.07 3.29*** -12.92*** 2.12** 5.15***
CAR(0;+1) 0.0066 2603 3.73*** 0.16 14.65*** -11.00*** 0.98 2.21**
CAR(0;+2) 0.0096 2603 4.04*** 0.19 23.99*** -10.05*** 0.98 1.09
The table above illustrates parametric and non-parametric tests applied to the overall sample. t-test is the standard
t-student test. Under suspicion of a CAR variance bias due to AR aggregation the use of J2 is more appropriate since
the J2 correction factor gives high weight to the observation with low variance. We reject the null hypothesis of J1
and J2 of absence of abnormal performance when jJ1j,jJ2j>1:64. Since abnormal returns are generally not normally
distributed we also look at non-parametric tests. The null hypothesis of sign test is the equidistribution of C(AR)s
signs around the median. Since the Lehman event has a negative impact on the market, the alternative hypothesis
is in our case that the number of minus signs is larger than that of plus signs. We reject the null hypothesis when:
Sign-Test< 1:64. The Corrado rank test assumes, under the null hypothesis that there is equidistribution in the
distance of ranked C(AR)s from median rank. We reject the null hypothesis when jCorrado-Testj>1:64. The power
of the Corrado test drops off rapidly as the number of the days in the CAR length increase (II type error-). The
G-rank-t (Kolari and Pynonnen, 2010 <34>) has the same null hypothesis of the Corrado test but is especially
devised for macro events since returns cross-correlation goes to zero by the properties of the G-Rank-t asymptotic
distribution.
Table 5: G-rank-t test for all samples estimation windows and for Monte Carlo
Simulation (MCS).
Sample MCS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES 8 months 6 months 4 months 2 months 8 months 6 months 4 months 2 months
AR(-1) 2.10** 1.10 1.08 0.81 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
AR(0) 2.12** 1.11 1.11 0.86 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
AR(+1) 2.13** 1.11 1.10 0.87 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
AR(+2) 2.13** 1.12 1.11 0.86 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
AR(+3) 2.23** 1.18 1.18 0.99 0.08 0.09 0.11 0.16
AR(0)-AR(-1) 1.51 5.15*** 6.04*** 6.42*** 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
CAR(0;+1) 2.10** 2.21** 2.18** 1.61 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
CAR(0;+2) 2.10** 1.09 1.07 0.79 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
The table above illustrates non-parametric G-Rank-t test for the all samples estimation windows for both sample
and MCS. The results on columns (5), (6), (7), (8) are the average value of the G-Rank-t test for the 10000 draw.
25Table 6: G-rank-t test for random data on all samples estimation windows.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
VARIABLES 8m 6m 4m 2m 8m 6m 4m 2m 8m 6m 4m 2m
AR(-1) 1.15 0.98 0.86 0.89 1.06 1.17 1.16 0.98 0.99 1.11 1.12 0.77
AR(0) 1.14 0.98 0.86 0.94 1.06 1.17 1.16 1.10 0.99 1.11 1.13 0.80
AR(+1) 1.15 0.99 0.87 0.93 1.06 1.17 1.16 1.10 0.99 1.11 1.13 0.83
AR(+2) 1.15 0.99 0.87 0.94 1.06 1.17 1.16 1.10 0.99 1.11 1.13 0.81
AR(+3) 1.16 1.00 0.89 0.96 1.06 1.17 1.16 1.10 0.99 1.11 1.12 0.82
AR(0)-AR(-1) 1.14 0.98 0.86 0.93 1.06 1.17 1.16 1.11 0.99 1.11 1.12 0.80
CAR(0;+1) 1.15 0.98 0.86 0.93 1.06 1.17 1.16 1.10 0.99 1.11 1.12 0.81
CAR(0;+2) 1.15 0.99 0.86 0.93 1.06 1.17 1.16 1.11 0.99 1.11 1.12 0.81
The table above illustrates non-parametric G-rank-t test for random data on all sample estimation windows. (1),
(2), (3) and (4) refers to the random selection for the 4/21/2008. (5), (6), (7) and (8) refers to the random selection
for the 8/18/2008. (9), (10), (11) and (12) refers to the random selection for the 9/2/2008. 8m, 6m, 4m, and 2m



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Criteria of KLD social ratings
SOCIAL ISSUE RATINGS 1
COMMUNITY STRENGTHS:
Charitable Giving (COM-str-A). The company has consistently given
over 1.5% of trailing three-year net earnings before taxes (NEBT) to char-
ity, or has otherwise been notably generous in its giving [In 2002, KLD
renamed the Generous Giving Strength as Charitable Giving]. Innova-
tive Giving (COM-str-B). The company has a notably innovative giving
program that supports nonprot organizations, particularly those promot-
ing self-suciency among the economically disadvantaged. Companies that
permit nontraditional federated charitable giving drives in the workplace
are often noted in this section as well. Support for Housing (COM-str-
C). The company is a prominent participant in public/private partnerships
that support housing initiatives for the economically disadvantaged, e.g.,
the National Equity Fund or the Enterprise Foundation. Support for Ed-
ucation (COM-str-D).The company has either been notably innovative in
its support for primary or secondary school education, particularly for those
programs that benet the economically disadvantaged, or the company has
prominently supported job-training programs for youth.Indigenous Peo-
ple Relations (COM-str-E). The company has established relations with
indigenous people in the areas of its proposed or current operations that
respect the sovereignty, land, culture, human rights, and intellectual prop-
erty of the indigenous people [added in 2000; in 2002 moved into the Human
Rights area].Non-US Charitable Giving (COM-str-F). The company has
made a substantial eort to make charitable contributions abroad, as well
as in the U.S. To qualify, a company must make at least 20% of its giving, or
have taken notably innovative initiatives in its giving program, outside the
U.S. Volunteer Programs (COM-str-G).The company has an exception-
ally strong volunteer program [added in 2005 ]. Other Strength(COM-str-
X). The company has either an exceptionally strong in-kind giving program,
or engages in other notably positive community activities.
COMMUNITY CONCERNS:
Investment Controversies (COM-con-A). The company is a nancial in-
stitution whose lending or investment practices have led to controversies,
particularly ones related to the Community Reinvestment Act. Negative
Economic Impact (COM-con-B). The company's actions have resulted
in major controversies concerning its economic impact on the community.
These controversies can include issues related to environmental contamina-
tion, water rights disputes, plant closings, "put-or-pay" contracts with trash
1Own elaboration of denitions and groups are updated to the last KLD release.
32incinerators, or other company actions that adversely aect the quality of
life, tax base, or property values in the community. Indigenous People
Relations (COM-con-C). The company has been involved in serious contro-
versies with indigenous people that indicate the company has not respected
the sovereignty, land, culture, human rights, and intellectual property of the
indigenous people [added in 2000; in 2002 moved into the Human Rights
area]. Disputes (COM-con-D). The company has recently been involved in
major tax disputes involving Federal, state, local or non-U.S. government
authorities, or is involved in controversies over its tax obligations to the com-
munity [entered in 1991; in 2005 moved into the Community area].Other
Concern (COM-con-X). The company is involved with a controversy that
has mobilized community opposition, or is engaged in other noteworthy com-
munity controversies.
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE STRENGTHS:
Limited Compensation(CGOV-str-A). The company has recently awarded
notably low levels of compensation to its top management or its board mem-
bers. The limit for a rating is total compensation of less than $500;000
per year for a CEO or $30;000 per year for outside directors. Owner-
ship Strength(CGOV-str-C). The company owns between 20% and 50%
of another company KLD has cited as having an area of social strength, or
is more than 20% owned by a rm that KLD has rated as having social
strengths. When a company owns more than 50% of another rm, it has
a controlling interest, and KLD treats the second rm as if it is a division
of the rst. Transparency Strength(CGOV-str-D). The company is par-
ticularly eective in reporting on a wide range of social and environmental
performance measures, or is exceptional in reporting on one particular mea-
sure [added in 2006; this strength incorporates information from the former
Environment: Communications Strength (ENV-str-E) as part of its con-
tent.].Accountability Strength (CGOV-str-E). The company has shown
markedly responsible leadership on public policy issues and/or has an ex-
ceptional record of transparency and accountability concerning its political
involvement in state or federal-level U.S. politics, or in non-U.S. politics
[added in 2006]. Other Strength(CGOV-str-X). The company has an in-
novative compensation plan for its board or executives, a unique and positive
corporate culture, or some other initiative not covered by other KLD ratings.
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CONCERNS:
High Compensation (CGOV-con-B). The company has recently awarded
notably high levels of compensation to its top management or its board mem-
bers. The limit for a rating is total compensation of more than $10million
per year for a CEO or $100;000 per year for outside directors. Ownership
Concern (CGOV-con-F). The company owns between 20% and 50% of a
company KLD has cited as having an area of social concern, or is more than
20% owned by a rm KLD has rated as having areas of concern. When a
33company owns more than 50% of another rm, it has a controlling interest,
and KLD treats the second rm as if it is a division of the rst. Accounting
Concern (CGOV-con-G). The company is involved in signicant accounting
related controversies [added in 2006]. Transparency Concern (CGOV-
con-H). The company is distinctly weak in reporting on a wide range of
social and environmental performance measures [added in 2006]. Political
Accountability Concern (CGOV-con-I). The company has been involved
in noteworthy controversies on public policy issues and/or has a very poor
record of transparency and accountability concerning its political involve-
ment in state or federal level U.S. politics, or in non-U.S. politics [added
in 2006].Other Concern (CGOV-con-X). The company restated its earn-
ings over an accounting controversy, has other accounting problems, or is
involved with some other controversy not covered by other KLD ratings.
DIVERSITY STRENGTHS:
CEO (DIV-str-A). The company's chief executive ocer is a woman or a
member of a minority group. Promotion (DIV-str-B). The company has
made notable progress in the promotion of women and minorities, particu-
larly to line positions with prot-and-loss responsibilities in the corporation.
Board of Directors (DIV-str-C). Women, minorities, and/or the disabled
hold four seats or more (with no double counting) on the board of direc-
tors, or one-third or more of the board seats if the board numbers less
than 12. Work/Life Benets (DIV-str-D). The company has outstand-
ing employee benets or other programs addressing work/life concerns, e.g.,
child care, elder care, or extime [entered in 1991 with the name Family
Benets Strength, it was renamed in 2005]. Women & Minority Con-
tracting (DIV-str-E). The company does at least 5% of its subcontracting,
or otherwise has a demonstrably strong record on purchasing or contract-
ing, with women- and/or minority-owned businesses. Employment of the
Disabled (DIV-str-F). The company has implemented innovative hiring
programs, other innovative human resource programs for the disabled, or
otherwise has a superior reputation as an employer of the disabled. Gay
& Lesbian Policies (DIV-str-G). The company has implemented notably
progressive policies toward its gay and lesbian employees. In particular, it
provides benets to the domestic partners of its employees [entered in 1991
with the name Progressive Gay/Lesbian Policies strength, it was renamed
in 1995]. Other Strength (DIV-str-X). The company has made a notable
commitment to diversity that is not covered by other KLD ratings.
DIVERSITY CONCERNS:
Controversies (DIV-con-A). The company has either paid substantial nes
or civil penalties as a result of armative action controversies, or has oth-
erwise been involved in major controversies related to armative action
issues. Non-Representation (DIV-con-B). The company has no women
on its board of directors or among its senior line managers. Other Con-
34cern (DIV-con-X). The company is involved in diversity controversies not
covered by other KLD ratings.
EMPLOYEE RELATIONS STRENGTHS:
Union Relations (EMP-str-A). The company has taken exceptional steps
to treat its unionized workforce fairly [entered in 1991 it was renamed from
Strong Union Relations]. No-Layo Policy (EMP-str-B). The company
has maintained a consistent no-layo policy [added in 1994]. Cash Prot
Sharing (EMP-str-C). The company has a cash prot-sharing program
through which it has recently made distributions to a majority of its work-
force. Employee Involvement (EMP-str-D). The company strongly en-
courages worker involvement and/or ownership through stock options avail-
able to a majority of its employees, gain sharing, stock ownership, sharing
of nancial information, or participation in management decision-making.
Retirement Benets Strength (EMP-str-F). The company has a no-
tably strong retirement benets program. KLD renamed this strength from
Strong Retirement Benets. Health and Safety Strength (EMP-str-G).
The company is noted by the US Occupational Health and Safety Admin-
istration for its safety programs. Other Strength (EMP-str-X).The com-
pany has strong employee relations initiatives not covered by other KLD
ratings.
EMPLOYEE RELATIONS CONCERNS:
Union Relations (EMP-con-A). The company has a history of notably
Poor Union Relations. Health and Safety Concern (EMP-con-B). The
company recently has either paid substantial nes or civil penalties for willful
violations of employee health and safety standards, or has been otherwise
involved in major health and safety controversies. Workforce Reduc-
tions (EMP-con-C). The company has reduced its workforce by 15% in the
most recent year or by 25% during the past two years, or it has announced
plans for such reductions. Retirement Benets Concern (EMP-con-D).
The company has either a substantially underfunded dened benet pension
plan, or an inadequate retirement benets program [entered in 1991 with the
name Pension/Benets Concern, it was renamed in 2004]. Other Concern.
The company is involved in an employee relations controversy that is not
covered by other KLD ratings.
ENVIRONMENTAL STRENGTHS:
Benecial Products and Services(ENV-str-A). The company derives
substantial revenues from innovative remediation products, environmental
services, or products that promote the ecient use of energy, or it has de-
veloped innovative products with environmental benets. (The term "en-
vironmental service" does not include services with questionable environ-
mental eects, such as landlls, incinerators, waste-to-energy plants, and
deep injection wells). Pollution Prevention (ENV-str-B). The company
35has notably strong pollution prevention programs including both emissions
reductions and toxic-use reduction programs. Recycling (ENV-str-C). The
company either is a substantial user of recycled materials as raw materials
in its manufacturing processes, or a major factor in the recycling industry.
Clean Energy(ENV-str-D). The company has taken signicant measures
to reduce its impact on climate change and air pollution through use of re-
newable energy and clean fuels or through energy eciency. The company
has demonstrated a commitment to promoting climate-friendly policies and
practices outside its own operations [entered in 1991 it was renamed from
Alternative Fuel Strength]. Communications (ENV-str-E). The company
is a signatory to the CERES Principles, publishes a notably substantive envi-
ronmental report, or has notably eective internal communications systems
in place for environmental best practices.[added in 1996; it was incorporated
with the Corporate Governance: Transparency rating (CGOV-str-D), which
was added in 2005]. Property, Plant, and Equipment (ENV-str-F). The
company maintains its property, plant, and equipment with above average
environmental performance for its industry. [added in 1995]. Management
Systems (ENV-str-G). The company has demonstrated a superior commit-
ment to management systems through ISO 14001 certication and other
voluntary programs [added in 2006]. Other Strength (ENV-str-X). The
company has demonstrated a superior commitment to management systems,
voluntary programs, or other environmentally proactive activities.
ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERNS:
Hazardous Waste (ENV-con-A). The company's liabilities for hazardous
waste sites exceed $50million, or the company has recently paid substantial
nes or civil penalties for waste management violations. Regulatory Prob-
lems. (ENV-con-B) The company has recently paid substantial nes or civil
penalties for violations of air, water, or other environmental regulations, or
it has a pattern of regulatory controversies under the Clean Air Act, Clean
Water Act or other major environmental regulations. Ozone Depleting
Chemicals. (ENV-con-C). The company is among the top manufacturers
of ozone depleting chemicals such as HCFCs, methyl chloroform, methylene
chloride, or bromines. Substantial Emissions. (ENV-con-D). The com-
pany's legal emissions of toxic chemicals (as dened by and reported to the
EPA) from individual plants into the air and water are among the high-
est of the companies followed by KLD. Agricultural Chemicals. (ENV-
con-E). The company is a substantial producer of agricultural chemicals,
i.e., pesticides or chemical fertilizers. Climate Change. (ENV-con-F).
The company derives substantial revenues from the sale of coal or oil and
its derivative fuel products, or the company derives substantial revenues
indirectly from the combustion of coal or oil and its derivative fuel prod-
ucts. Such companies include electric utilities, transportation companies
with eets of vehicles, auto and truck manufacturers, and other transporta-
tion equipment companies. Other Concern. (ENV-con-X). The company
36has been involved in an environmental controversy that is not covered by
other KLD ratings.
HUMAN RIGHTS STRENGTHS:
Positive Record in South Africa (HUM-str-A). The company's social
record in South Africa is noteworthy [existed only in 1994 and 1995]. In-
digenous Peoples Relations Strength. (HUM-str-D). See Community
Indigenous Peoples Relations (COM-str-E) [added in 2000 under Commu-
nity, from 2004 moved in Human Rights]. Labor Rights Strength (HUM-
str-G). The company has outstanding transparency on overseas sourcing dis-
closure and monitoring, or has particularly good union relations outside the
U.S., or has undertaken labor rights-related initiatives that KLD considers
outstanding or innovative [added in 2002]. Other Strength.(HUM-str-X)
The company has undertaken exceptional human rights initiatives, includ-
ing outstanding transparency or disclosure on human rights issues, or has
otherwise shown industry leadership on human rights issues not covered by
other KLD human rights ratings [entered in 1994].
HUMAN RIGHTS CONCERNS:
South Africa (HUM-con-A). The company faced controversies over its op-
erations in South Africa [existed from 1991 to 1994]. Northern Ireland
(HUM-con-B). The company has operations in Northern Ireland [existed
from 1991 to 1994]. Burma Concern(HUM-con-C). The company has op-
erations or direct investment in, or sourcing from, Burma. [added in 1995].
Mexico (HUM-con-D). The company's operations in Mexico have had ma-
jor recent controversies, especially those related to the treatment of employ-
ees or degradation of the environment [existed from 1995 to 2002]. Labor
Rights Concern (HUM-con-F). The company's operations have had ma-
jor recent controversies primarily related to labor standards in its supply
chain [added in 1998; it was lately renamed from the International Labor
Concern]. Indigenous Peoples Relations Concern (HUM-con-G). The
company has been involved in serious controversies with indigenous peoples
(either in or outside the U.S.) that indicate the company has not respected
the sovereignty, land, culture, human rights, and intellectual property of
indigenous peoples [added in 2000]. Other Concern (HUM-con-X). The
company's operations have been the subject of major recent human rights
controversies not covered by other KLD ratings.
PRODUCT STRENGTHS:
Quality (PRO-str-A). The company has a long-term, well-developed, company-
wide quality program, or it has a quality program recognized as exceptional
in U.S. industry. R&D/Innovation (PRO-str-B). The company is a leader
in its industry for research and development (R&D), particularly by bring-
ing notably innovative products to market. Benets to Economically
Disadvantaged (PRO-str-C). The company has as part of its basic mis-
37sion the provision of products or services for the economically disadvantaged.
Other Strength (PRO-str-X). The company's products have notable social
benets that are highly unusual or unique for its industry.
PRODUCT CONCERNS:
Product Safety (PRO-con-A). The company has recently paid substan-
tial nes or civil penalties, or is involved in major recent controversies or
regulatory actions, relating to the safety of its products and services. Mar-
keting/Contracting Concern (PRO-con-D). The company has recently
been involved in major marketing or contracting controversies, or has paid
substantial nes or civil penalties relating to advertising practices, consumer
fraud, or government contracting. (Formerly: Marketing/Contracting Con-
troversy). Antitrust (PRO-con-E). The company has recently paid sub-
stantial nes or civil penalties for antitrust violations such as price xing,
collusion, or predatory pricing, or is involved in recent major controver-
sies or regulatory actions relating to antitrust allegations. Other Concern
(PRO-con-X). The company has major controversies with its franchises, is
an electric utility with nuclear safety problems, defective product issues, or
is involved in other product related controversies not covered by other KLD
ratings.
ALCOHOL (ALC-con-A) : Licensing. The company licenses its
company or brand name to alcohol products. Manufacturers. Companies
that are involved in the manufacture alcoholic beverages including beer,
distilled spirits, or wine. Manufacturers of Products Necessary for
Production of Alcoholic Beverages. Companies that derive 15% or
more of total revenues from the supply of raw materials and other products
necessary for the production of alcoholic beverages. Retailers. Companies
that derive 15% or more of total revenues from the distribution (wholesale
or retail) of alcoholic beverages. Ownership by an Alcohol Company.
The company is more than 50% owned by a company with alcohol involve-
ment. Ownership of an Alcohol Company. The company owns more
than 20% of another company with alcohol involvement. (When a company
owns more than 50% of company with alcohol involvement, KLD treats the
alcohol company as a consolidated subsidiary.) (ALC-con-X): Alcohol
Other Concern. The company derives substantial revenues from the ac-
tivities closely associated with the production of alcoholic beverages [KLD
assigned concerns in this category through 2002].
GAMBLING (GAM-con-A): Licensing. The company licenses its
company or brand name to gambling products. Manufacturers. Compa-
nies that produce goods used exclusively for gambling, such as slot machines,
roulette wheels, or lottery terminals. Owners and Operators. Companies
that own and/or operate casinos, racetracks, bingo parlors, or other betting
establishments, including casinos; horse, dog, or other race tracks that per-
38mit wagering; lottery operations; on-line gambling; pari-mutuel wagering
facilities; bingo; Jai-alai; and other sporting events that permit wagering.
Supporting Products or Services. Companies that provide services in
casinos that are fundamental to gambling operations, such as credit lines,
consulting services, or gambling technology and technology support. Own-
ership by a Gambling Company. The company is more than 50% owned
by a company with gambling involvement. Ownership of a Gambling
Company. The company owns more than 20% of another company with
gambling involvement. (When a company owns more than 50% of company
with gambling involvement, KLD treats the gambling company as a consoli-
dated subsidiary.) (GAM-con-X): Gambling Other Concern The company
derives substantial revenues from the activities closely associated with the
production of goods and services closely related to the gambling industry or
lottery industries [KLD assigned concerns in this category through 2002].
TOBACCO (TOB-con-A): Licensing The company licenses its com-
pany name or brand name to tobacco products. Manufacturers. The com-
pany produces tobacco products, including cigarettes, cigars, pipe tobacco,
and smokeless tobacco products. Manufacturers of Products Neces-
sary for Production of Tobacco Products. The company derives 15%
or more of total revenues from the production and supply of raw materi-
als and other products necessary for the production of tobacco products.
Retailers. The company derives 15% or more of total revenues from the
distribution (wholesale or retail) of tobacco products. Ownership by a
Tobacco Company. The company is more than 50% owned by a company
with tobacco involvement. Ownership of a Tobacco Company. The
company owns more than 20% of another company with tobacco involve-
ment. (When a company owns more than 50% of company with tobacco in-
volvement, KLD treats the tobacco company as a consolidated subsidiary).
(TOB-con-X): Tobacco Other Concern The company derives substan-
tial revenues from the production of tobacco products [added in 2002].
FIREARMS (FIR-con-A): Manufacturers. The company is en-
gaged in the production of small arms ammunition or rearms, including,
pistols, revolvers, ries, shotguns, or sub-machine guns. Retailers. The
company derives 15% or more of total revenues from the distribution (whole-
sale or retail) of rearms and small arms ammunition. Ownership by a
Firearms Company. The company is more than 50% owned by a company
with rearms involvement. Ownership of a Firearms Company. The
company owns more than 20% of another company with rearms involve-
ment. (When a company owns more than 50% of company with rearms
involvement, KLD treats the rearms company as a consolidated subsidiary)
[added in 1999].
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Systems. Companies that derive more than 2% of revenues from the sale of
conventional weapons or weapons systems, or earned 50 million or more from
the sale of conventional weapons or weapons systems, or earned 10 million or
more from the sale of nuclear weapons or weapons systems. Manufactur-
ers of Components for Weapons or Weapons Systems. Companies
that derive more than 2% of revenues from the sale of customized compo-
nents for conventional weapons or weapons systems, or earned 50 million
or more from the sale of customized components for conventional weapons
or weapons systems, or earned 10 million or more from the sale of cus-
tomized components for nuclear weapons or weapons systems. Ownership
by a Military Company. The company is more than 50% owned by a
company with military involvement. Ownership of a Military Com-
pany. The company owns more than 20% of another company with mili-
tary involvement. (When a company owns more than 50% of company with
military involvement, KLD treats the military company as a consolidated
subsidiary) [entered since 1991]. (MIL-con-B): Minor Weapons Con-
tracting Involvement. The company has minor involvement in weapons-
related contracting. In the most recent scal year for which information is
available, it derived 10 to 50 million in conventional weapons-related prime
contracts (when that gure is less that 2% of revenue), or 1 to 10 mil-
lion from nuclear weapons-related prime contracts [existed just from 1991
to 2002]. (MIL-con-C): Major Weapons-related Supplier. During
the last scal year, the company received from the Department of Defense
more than 50 million for fuel or other supplies related to weapons [existed
just from 1991 to 2002]. (MIL-con-X): Military Other Concern. The
company has substantial involvement in weapons-related contracting. In
the most recent scal year for which information is available, it derived
more than 2% of sales or 50 million from weapons-related contracting, or
it received more than 10 million in nuclear weapons-related prime contracts
[existed just through 2002].
NUCLEAR POWER (NUC-con-A): Construction & Design of
Nuclear Power Plants. The company designs, engineers, and constructs
nuclear power plants and nuclear reactors for use in nuclear power plants;
including companies that design nuclear reactors and engineer and/or con-
struct nuclear power plants. Nuclear Power Fuel and Key Parts. The
company supplies nuclear fuel material and key parts used in nuclear plants
and reactors. Fuel includes mining of uranium and conversion, enrichment,
and fabrication of uranium. Key parts include manufacture or sale of spe-
cialized parts for use in nuclear power plants including but not exclusive to
steam generators, control rod drive mechanisms, reactor vessels, cooling sys-
tems, containment structures, fuel assemblies, and digital instrumentation
& controls. Nuclear Power Service Provider. The company is involved
40in the transport of nuclear power materials and nuclear plant maintenance.
Ownership of Nuclear Power Plants. The company has an owner-
ship interest or operates nuclear power plant(s). Does not include publicly
traded companies that are an owner or operator of a nuclear plant that
has shut down and is being decommissioned. Ownership by a Nuclear
Power Company. The company is more than 50% owned by a company
with nuclear power involvement. Ownership of a Nuclear Power Com-
pany. The company owns more than 20% of another company with nuclear
power involvement. If company ownership of company with nuclear power
involvement is greater than 50%, KLD treats subsidiary as a consolidated
subsidiary. (NUC-con-C): Design. The company derives identiable
revenues from the design of nuclear power plants. This category does not
include companies providing construction or maintenance services for nu-
clear power plants [existed just through 2002; it was re-instated as Con-
struction & Design of Nuclear Power Plants under the code NUC-con-A in
2005]. (NUC-con-D): Fuel Cycle/Key Parts. The company mines, pro-
cesses, or enriches uranium, or is otherwise involved in the nuclear fuel cycle.
Or, the company derives substantial revenues from the sale of key parts or
equipment for generating power through using nuclear fuels. [existed just
through 2002; it was re-instated as Nuclear Power Fuel and Key Parts under
the code NUCcon- A]. (NUC-con-X): Nuclear Power Other Concern.
The company is involved in the production of Nuclear Power[existed just
through 2002].
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FTSE KLD 400 Social Index Methodology
Domini Research & Analytics, Inc. (KLD) was acquired by RiskMetrics
Group in 2009 (hereby RiskMetrics-KLD). KLD was an independent invest-
ment research and index company founded in 1988. KLD provided research,
indexes, consulting and compliance services to institutions for integration
of environmental, social and governance (ESG) factor into their investment
strategies.
RiskMetrics-KLD researches the social, environmental, and governance
performance of corporations (ESG) and its research relies on four distinct
data sources. Data are collected in a disciplined process from a wide va-
riety of companies, government, non-government organization and media
sources. RiskMetrics-KLD tracks each company through more than 14000
global media sources daily. RiskMetrics-KLD uses three processes to main-
tain the accuracy and currency of its research:
 Continuous updates: daily updates from media sources and special
updates from NGOs and government data sources
 Fiscal year updates: annual updates from company public documents
 Annual updates: a comprehensive annual review that includes analysis
of all information gathered throughout the year, review of company
websites and CSR reports, and direct communication with the com-
pany, NGOs, and research partners.
RiskMetrics-KLD's products and services help institutional investors and
money managers meet their duciary responsibilities. RiskMetrics-KLD in-
dexes are accepted as the benchmark for investment strategies and they are
designed to be transparent, representative and investable.
The FTSE KLD 400 Social Index is now a oat-adjusted, market capitalization-
weighted, common stock index of US equities. Launched by KLD in May
1990, the FTSE KLD 400 Social Index (formerly Domini 400 Social Index,
DSI 400) was the rst benchmark index constructed using environmental,
social and governance (ESG) factors. The DSI 400 was renamed the FTSE
KLD 400 Social Index in July 2009. By combining RiskMetrics-KLD's re-
search leadership with FTSE's indexing expertise, the new series provides a
cutting-edge range of index solutions across a variety of ESG themes in fact
it is a widely recognized benchmark for measuring the impact of social and
environmental screening on investment portfolios. The index holds compa-
nies that have positive environmental, social and governance performance
relative to their industry and sector peers, and in relation to the broader
market.
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nies included in the Standard & Poor's 500 Index, approximately 100 addi-
tional large companies not included in the S&P 500 but providing industry
representation, and approximately 50 additional companies with particu-
larly strong social characteristics. The eligible universe is the 3000 largest
U.S. Equity; RiskMetrics-KLD uses a two-step screening process for selecting
companies for the FTSE KLD 400 Social Index; rst excludes from consid-
eration companies involved in Controversial Business; second RiskMetrics-
KLD selects companies that have positive ESG records and evaluates com-
panies in the context of their industry, sector, market capitalization and
S&P 500 status.
Companies are selected as potential candidates for the DS400 based
on an assessment of the current index composition and anticipated future
changes to the index. RiskMetrics-KLD ensures that there are sucient
approved candidates to meet the various need of the index at any point of
time. RiskMetrics-KLD selects candidates from the universe of nancially
qualied companies that meet one or more of the following criteria:
 ESG performance
 Sector and industry representation
 Market capitalization
 S&P 500 status
The FTSE KLD 400 Social Index is maintained at 400 constituents at
all times. An index addition is made only if a vacancy is created by an
index removal and addition are selected from a list of approved companies.
Furthermore RiskMetrics-KLD seeks to maintain the composition of Index
holdings at approximately 90% large cap companies, 9% mid cap compa-
nies, chosen for sector diversication, and 1% small cap companies with
exemplary social and environmental records.
Once a company has been selected as a FTSE KLD 400 Social Index
potential, it undergoes a rigorous evaluation by the sector analyst. He com-
pletes a comprehensive evaluation from their recommendation detailing why
the company should or should not be added to the Index. Companies that
have positive social and environmental records are evaluated on the follow-
ing issues: community relations, diversity, employee relations, human rights,
product quality and safety, and environment and corporate governance. The
companies are analyzed in the context of their industry and sector as well
as in relation to the broader market.
Companies that are identied as having deteriorating a ESG performance
in one or more of the qualitative issue areas may be added to the FTSE KLD
400 Social Index watch list. The FTSE KLD 400 Social Index Committee
will monitor the company's progress and continue to engage the company,
43until it decides to remove the company from the watch list or remove the
company from the index. The FTSE KLD 400 Social Index Committee may
remove companies from the index at any time due to the corporate actions,
concerns about nancial quality, failure of ESG screens, deteriorating ESG
performance or lack of social representation.
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Industry Classication Benchmark (ICB) Classication
INDUSTRY SUPERSECTOR SECTOR SUBSECTOR
Automobiles
Automobiles & Parts Automobiles & Parts Auto Parts
Tires
Brewers
Beverage Distillers and Vintners
Food & Beverage Soft Drinks
Food Producers Farming & Fishing
Food Products
Durable Household Products






























Chemicals Chemicals Commodity Chemicals
Specialty Chemicals
Basic Resource













Pharmaceuticals & Biotechnology Biotechnology
Pharmaceuticals
Telecommunication Equipment
TELECOMMUNICATIONS Telecommunications Fixed Line Telecommunications Fixed Line Telecommunications





Property and Casualty insurance
Reinsurance
Life Insurance Life Insurance
Financial Services
Real Estate
Real Estate Holding & Development







Equity Investment Instruments Equity Investment Instruments
Nonequity Investment Instruments Nonequity Investment Instruments
Construction & Materials Construction & Materials
Building Materials & Fixtures
Heavy Construction







Electronic and Electrical Equipment
Electrical Components & Equipment
Electronic Equipment
Industrial Engineering










Business Training & Employment Agencies
Financial Administration
Industrial Suppliers
Waste & Disposal Services
Oil & Gas
Oil & Gas Producers
Exploration & Production
OIL & GAS Integrated Oil & Gas
Oil Equipment, Services & Distribution
Oil Equipment & Services
Pipelines
Technology




Technology Hardware & Equipment
Computer Hardware







Gas, Water & Multiutilities
Multiutilities
Water
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